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Frankfurt-type cases with covered manipulation received a great attention in the debates about freedom of will and moral responsibility. They pretend to give the refutation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and to show that we can intuitively blame or praise an agent who was not able to do otherwise. In this paper, I will try to make explicit some basic intuitions underlying the agent's responsibility in Frankfurt-type cases, which were surprisingly ignored in the contemporary debates. The key intuition is that the responsibility of the agent in Frankfurt-type cases is always grounded at the point of overcoming the uncertainty preceding action. This overcoming is crucially important for agent's responsibility and immune to any manipulation of counterfactual intervener.

Book Note: Disclosing the World: On the Phenomenology of Language, by Andrew Inkpin Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2016, pp. xvi + 381, US$43 (hardback).

Koyré, his historical and philosophical studies, influence and heritage.

Koyré in Context, correlated studies and paradigms in the sciences, and in the history and philosophy of sciences

Предметом данной статьи является подход средневекового схоласта У. Оккама к анализу условий истинности временных и модальных пропозиция. Основной целью статьи является  показать основные сходаства между ними. В обоих случаях Оккам выделяет два смысла и создает два новых типа пропозиции.

What is being? This is, from the Greeks to Hegel (according to Heidegger), the guiding question of ontology and the history of philosophy as metaphysics. And the answer is presence: ‘being’ means ‘being present’, ‘presencing’; ‘to be’ means ‘to be present’. By clarifying the limit of this philosophy of presence, however, it is possible to go beyond it, to a thinking of being as presence and absence—for both coming-to-presence and going-out-into-absence are ways in which beings are, and being happens. And yet, are presence and absence the only ways to think being? On the contrary—there is a third. From the Greeks (through Hegel) to Heidegger, the being that fails to come to presence, but also does not simply remain in absence—this is what is merely implied, an implication. But then what does it mean to think being as implied? Being as implying? As an implication?

Everything real joins together in the unity of the world”—so begins the Ideas. And with this, it seems that Husserl provides the clearest example of how to think our world, not just within the phenomenological tradition (as a modification and reestablishment of Greek metaphysics, as truly universal ontology), but in the history of philosophy—the total unity of history—our history, that animated Greek philosophy from its beginnings. But what is this world? And what is its unity? Or more precisely, how can unity join everything real—humans and animals, plants and stones, indeed the whole of nature, the entire cosmos—together in the world? Or is there not another way of thinking unity, of going to the unity of the world itself? And one that has implications (intentional or not) for phenomenology, for our thinking of unity, perhaps even for the crisis of an entirely “unquestioned” philosophical tradition?

A threat is a strange thing—for it is neither simply a deed done, nor undone. But if we think the threat in terms of the presence or absence of an actual or potential threat—as the history of philosophy (from the Greeks, through Hegel, to us) has done, then we miss what is threatening. For the threat—whether to life and limb, freedom or identity, or to an individual or group, family and friends, civil society or a state or the world as a whole—is the suspension of action. Then the threat is prior to possibility and impossibility, necessity and contingency, presence and absence. But this too, is a threat—and one that implicates us—at least insofar as the implied threat implies the threat of implication.

Dans quelle mesure et dans quel sens peut-on parler d’une « méthode » par rapport aux écrits patristiques ? La question même nous fournit l’a priori fondamental pour l’enquête suivante : on entend par là que les textes concernés ne sont pas construits εἰκῇ, mais qu’on est en mesure de discerner derrière eux un principe organisateur, une voie (μέθοδος) suivie par l’auteur plus ou moins consciemment. Dans l’Antiquité tardive, à laquelle appartiennent, au moins chronologiquement, les Péres de l’Église, ce principe organisateur est offert par deux piliers de la formation classique : la rhétorique et la philosophie.

The paper discusses the realistic application of Plato’s Kallipolis, providing results of recent studies on Greek colonization and cultural poetics. The Republic is just one among other colonization projects proposed by Athenian intellectuals in 4th century BC. Participants of the dialogue are quite familiar with real colonization practices. Socrates gives concise and clear indications on the typical recolonisation scenario to implement. The notoriously enigmatic saying that the ideal polis is to be found “nowhere on earth,” should be examined in the context of legendary tales about the foundations of colonies.

In this chapter follows, we shall try to reconstruct the making of the protreptic genre, relying mainly on the Corpus Platonicum (CP), considered as a collection of texts produced by Plato and his disciples. The focus will be, first, on the premises which led to the creation of the specific text labelled as ‘protreptic’ in the Euthydemus; second, we shall trace subsequent recognition of protreptic as a genre, documented in the spurious Clitophon.

This chapter attempts to outline the disciplinary tradition of protreptic and to highlight certain methodological difficulties connected to it. The lamentations concerning “the scandalous state of genre theory” (Jordan 1986:328) in general and the protreptic genre in particular have themselves become a generic convention in studies dealing with this topic, and not without reason. To begin with, the genre received in antiquity no rhetorical treatment as a distinctive form of oratory, whereas references to the protreptic χαρακτήρ in philosophers are scarce and contradictory. Our capacity to proceed by means of description is also limited, for many writings entitled “protreptic” have only survived in fragments (and reconstructions often proceed from the postulation of a “generic pattern”, which itself needs justification). Another complicating factor is that the historical and philological instrumentarium has been supplemented, with varying success, with approaches like motif analysis, theories of intertextuality or narratology, or various communication approaches. Consequently, the term ‘protreptic’ has come to be used in a loose and imprecise manner depending on the position adopted by the author.  The next vexing problem encountered by those who wish to understand protreptic concerns demarcation. Protreptic frequently appears in combination with other literary types, (auto)-biography, paraenesis, or epistolography, for example. How do different types cohabit within one piece of writing? Various, sometimes mutually exclusive, solutions have been suggested by scholars which we will discuss in what follows. Lastly, problems are aggravated by the fact that historians of philosophy on the one hand, and biblical scholars and specialists in Jewish and Christian literature on the other, have approached the term “protreptic” and its cognates in very different ways. Although the interdisciplinary gap seems to be diminishing the question still remains open as to how the classical forms of protreptic were adapted in the prophetic religions like Judaism and Christianity.

Статья посвящена сравнению концепций гражданского воспитания, разработанных двумя крупными теоретиками педагогики раннего Нового времени — Яном Амосом Коменским и Джамбаттистой Вико. Доказывается, что, если у Коменского обучение благоразумию (prudentia) посредством обращения себе на пользу случая (emendatio casus) осмысляется в категориях христианско-стоической аскезы, то Вико основывает свою гражданскую пайдейю на устроении дорефлексивной сферы посредством топики и риторики.