Публикации

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This paper provides a foundation for a form of phenomenology, namely phenomenological, that rejects the traditional phenomenology of religion in order to provide a cognitive and non-theological discipline in the study of religion. Proposed amendments to phenomenology are based on the ideas of E. Husserl. The simultaneous strict distinction and necessary cooperation between facts and phenomena provided by the impurity of pure consciousness in admitting the outside world might enable the extension of scientific criteria to this reimagined phenomenology. Pure consciousness is considered irreducible to thought and cognitivity (feeling and accordingly, faith, might thus be viewed as a non-cognitive, purely emotional stream). This new comprehension of the phenomenology of religion could represent religion in all its contexts (God, supernatural forces as well as holy places, churches, utensils, texts etc) in the pure consciousness of the believer, as the effects of its structures, namely feeling and thought and their interactions and peculiarities.

Dieser Artikel widmet sich dem Vergleich der logischen Gesinnungen zweier Autoren, die der diametral entgegengesetzten Meinungen waren, nämlich Wilhelm Wundt und Gottlob Frege. Wundt gilt als ein Psychologismusunterstützer und Frege ist als Antipsychologist bekannt. Psychologisten und Antipsychologisten könnten »die erklärten Feinde« genannt werden. Dennoch gab es fast keine Autoren, die sich als Psychologisten identifizieren wollten; so war auch Wundt, der kein reiner Psychologist war. Freges Gesichtspunkt war ebenfalls nicht frei von Herausforderungen. Üblicherweise wurden ihre Konzeptionen als die ihre jeweilige Klasse repräsentierende betrachten. Der vorliegende Beitrag wird den Fokus auf die Berührungsstellen ihrer Theorien legen.

It is almost universally accepted that the Frege-Geach Point is necessary for explaining the inferential relations and compositional structure of truth-functionally complex propositions. I argue that this claim rests on a disputable view of propositional structure, which models truth-functionally complex propositions on atomic propositions. I propose an alternative view of propositional structure, based on a certain notion of simulation, which accounts for the relevant phenomena without accepting the Frege-Geach Point. The main contention is that truth-functionally complex propositions do not include as their parts truth-evaluable propositions, but their simulations, which are neither forceful nor truth-evaluable. The view makes room for the idea that there is no such thing as the forceless expression of propositional contents and is attractive because it provides the resources for avoiding a fundamental problem generated by the Frege-Geach Point concerning the relation between forceless and forceful expressions of propositional contents. I further argue that the acceptance of the Frege-Geach Point mars Peter Hanks’ and François Recanati’s recent attempts to resist the widespread idea that assertoric force is extrinsic to the expression of propositional contents. Rejecting this idea, I maintain, requires a deeper break with the tradition than Hanks and Recanati have allowed for.