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What is to Be Done? Art Practice, Theory and Criticism in Russia during the Long Nineteenth Century
Like all empires, the Soviet Empire was also based on the distinction centre–periphery. Although the Soviet Empire no longer exists, relationships between centres and peripheries still shape realities in the region. The book analyses the relevance of this distinction for the understanding of political, economic, and cultural realities in the post-Soviet space. Case studies provided by scholars from different countries of the former Soviet Union explore the potential of the distinction in historical as well as in economic and political perspectives.
This article is a study of an honorific inscription from a statue base of Andreas, an imperial official in late fourth–early fifth antique Ephesos. By combining insights from the literary and intertextual analysis of the inscription with a discussion of the visual associations which the text relies on, we argue that Andreas’ inscribed praises find itself at the intersection of classicizing literary idiom, visual patterns of representation of the imperial power attested on coins, and New Testament phrasing. The inscribed honorific statue therefore is an instance of appropriation of traditionally Roman and Hellenic visual, ideological, and literary discourses by the increasingly Christian authors, readers, and viewers of public inscriptions in late antique cityscapes. It attests to profound, if subtly manifesting, shifts in the ‘epigraphic habit’ in late antiquity that were informed by the emergence of hybrid, equally Roman and Christian, identities and ways of representing them epigraphically
The Jünger brothers count among those authors of the 20th century who are particularly sensitive to developments in technology and the media. With his two seminal essays "Die totale Mobilmachung" (1930) and "Der Arbeiter. Herrschaft und Gestalt" (1932), Ernst Jünger set standards in the interpretation of these developments. With "Die Perfektion der Technik" (1946), Friedrich Georg Jünger opened up an independent approach to technology that was quite different from that of his brother. This issue of the Jünger yearbook contains essays by renowned Jünger researchers on this topic as well as the first publication of the verbatim transcription of a part of the "Arbeiter" manuscript including a facsimile.
Functional fixedness is related to excessive focusing on a specific functional property of an object. We assumed that the naming of other objects which possess the same functional property to a lesser extent than a given object can reduce the excessive focusing on this functional property for this object. It can help to loosen functional fixedness and improve individual creative performance. We tested the effectiveness of this method with 302 participants aged between 17 and 22 (256 female and 46 male). The study consisted of two experiments with 110 and 192 participants, respectively. Prior to performing a creative activity (story writing in Experiment 1 and thinking up unusual uses of a given object in Experiment 2), participants from different groups were asked to name objects which possess the main functional property of the given object to the same extent, to a lesser extent, and to a greater extent, respectively. In both phases of the study, we found a significant effect on the extent of the target property possession on originality. Results showed that participants named objects with the lesser manifestation of a target property outperformed their counterparts from other groups.
Dieser Beitrag widmet sich den bedeutsamsten theoretischen Stufen in der Vorgeschichte der Religionspsychologie in Deutschland, die sich im Laufe des langen 19. Jahrhunderts entwickelte. Die unterschiedlichen Skizzen und Projekte der psychologischen Forschung auf religiösem Gebiet wurden damals vor allem im theologischen Milieu entworfen. Die Haupttendenzen ihrer konzeptuellen Entwicklung können anhand der Bedeutungsveränderung der ‚Stichwörter‘ wie [religiöse] Erfahrung, Selbstbeobachtung und Wert nachverfolgt werden. Von Anfang an zielten Philosophen wie J. Fries und Theologen wie Chr. Weisse auf größtmögliche Exaktheit und Strenge der zu erarbeitenden Methode. Sie setzten dabei ihre Hoffnungen in die Selbstbeobachtung, aber der Einfluss W. Wundts ließ Zweifel daran aufkommen. Deshalb glaubten manche Theologen ab den 1890er Jahren, die unvermeidlichen Nachteile der Introspektion durch die Anwendung der interaktiven bzw. instrumentalen Methoden der psychologischen Untersuchung aufheben zu können. Außerdem waren die deutschen religionspsychologischen Entwürfe des 19. Jahrhunderts stark axiologisch orientiert: Es handelte sich um die Wertgefühle bzw. Werturteile (d. h. weltanschaulich bzw. doktrinell gefärbtes affektives Fürwahrhalten) als den wesentlichsten Bestandteil der Religiosität überhaupt. Diese Tendenz schwächte sich zum Ende des langen 19. Jahrhunderts ab.
Conference proceedings of the V. annual German conference at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, April 17, 2019.
Kant famously claims that we have all freely chosen evil. This paper offers a novel account of the much-debated justification for this claim. I reconstruct Kant’s argument from his affirmation that we all have a price – we can all succumb to temptation. I argue that this follows a priori from a theoretical principle of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely that all empirical powers have a finite, changeable degree, an intensive magnitude. Because of this, our reason can always be overpowered by sensible inclinations. Kant moreover holds that this necessary feature of our moral psychology should not have been the case: We ought to instead be like the divine human being, for whom the moral law yields a greater incentive than any possible temptation. On Kant’s view, we are thus responsible for having a price, and the synthetic a priori fact that we do proves that we each made an initial choice of evil.
NaCl is one of the simplest compounds and was thought to be well-understood, and yet, unexpected complexities related to it were uncovered at high pressure and in low-dimensional states. Here, exotic hexagonal NaCl thin films on the (110) diamond surface were crystallized in the experiment following a theoretical prediction based on ab initio evolutionary algorithm USPEX. State-of-the-art calculations and experiments showed the existence of a hexagonal NaCl thin film, which is due to the strong chemical interaction of the NaCl film with the diamond substrate.
The book focuses most of all on women's and partly on men's agency, to discuss variant ways in which women and men actively use their scopes of action - through political activism, protest, movements, in the military. The book is aiming to dicuss variant perspectives on these issues in different contexts witin Eastern Europe. How do these in change affect conservative societies and the concepts of masculinity?
The volume is structured in four parts:
I) Floating concepts of Femininities and Masculinities
(essentially this is a discussion on the role of feminism in the transformation period in Eastern Europe)
II) Political Activism
(this part deals with political participation of women - also within conservative parties - and of variant forms of protest)
III) Nationalism and Militarization of societies
(also papers on violence)
IV) Social Roles and Concepts of Women and Men
This text begins by applying the critique of phrenology to contemporary neuro-science in order to raise, once again, the question of consciousness. I then argue that consciousness is a process and product of the body, driven by history; like the work (and a work ) of art. This becomes clearer with Hegel's differentiation between human and animal consciousness, that is, in how our language and thought can tolerate contradiction, even grasp it as true. Thus, as Aristotle knew: consciousness is to the body as the sign is to the referent — and this has implications for our very survival.
Does Kant hold that we can have intuitions independently of concepts? A striking passage from §13 of the Critique of Pure Reason appears to say so explicitly. However, it also conjures up a scenario where the categories are inapplicable to objects of intuition, a scenario presumably shown impossible by the following Transcendental Deduction. The seemingly non-conceptualist claim concerning intuition have therefore been read, by conceptualist interpreters of Kant, as similarly counterpossible. I argue that the passage in question best supports an underappreciated middle position where intuition requires a pre-conceptual use of the understanding. Such preconceptual use of the understanding faces both textual and systematic objections. I show that these objections can be rebutted.
In this article I analyse retrospectively main directions in the interpretation of the notion sobornost’ in modern Russian philosophical thought. Key for religious Russian Philosophy on the border of the XIX - XX centuries, this term hasn't lost its importance today, but it has acquired some new senses and significations. Religious-philosophical and epistemological notion first and foremost, it was transformed into ontological and anthropological category, what allowed to describe the Russian national current community as "conciliarity" corresponding to “Russian idea”.
The principle of Last Resort belongs to the core principles of Just War Theory. It is regarded as one of the contstraints on war. In its application the combatants are concerned with taking all possible efforts not to be provoced to start a war before it is truly necessary or unavoidable. In this chapter we not only look throuhg the theoretical aspects, but also consider a number of practical cases.
This paper is concerned with Frege’s logical aliens argument against psychologism in logic that leans on the ideas of uniqueness of logic and the understanding of normativity of logic in such a way that everybody should obey the rules of the classical logic system in all circumstances. The paper argues that this argument becomes too radical in the context of current philosophy in logic. The possible answer to Frege’s argument could be inspirited by the philosophical ideas of later Wittgenstein: we play different language games, and some of them are logical games. Logical reasoning is to be understood as a kind of dialogical practice and in the process of the ontogeny people learn some sorts of logical games typical for their culture and concerned with their activity. However, different people have different criteria of certainty and not all of them can play logical games. The capacity to play logical games depends on various factors (e.g. culture, educational level, motivation, etc.) and it is connected with main practices that one involved in. In order to talk about logical aliens one should first find out what criteria of certainty his opponent has and what language game he or she plays. This gives new comprehension of the normativity of logic that shows that there are no logical aliens in absolute sense. This view can give in turn a new understanding of what rationality is and show why logic and psychology should interact.
The article gives an outline of masculine strategies in the context of sociocultural preferences of
post-Soviet Orthodoxy. The article reveals the specific features of deformation and distortion of normative
masculine strategies in the conditions of religious conservatism and the post-secular resort to patriarchal
norms, which causes a lack of men in the Orthodox Church, i.e., a certain masculinity crisis. The author
subjects to verification the traditional view of gender imbalance, showing that this imbalance is
diminishing, although there are still fewer men in the church (participating in worship and church life)
than women. The evidenced decline of the percentage disparity between men and women in the church
environment over the past 30 years allows us to acknowledge a partial overcoming of masculinity crisis
in the Orthodox environment. Analyzing the limitations of ways to realize normative masculinity in the
Orthodox environment, the author shows that the way out of this crisis are three ways of
hypercompensation: consumerization of the church space, involvement in the global imperial project of
Orthodox civilization and cultivating of a special religious attitude toward the war, accompanied by the
militarization of the church culture. At least the second option and the third one involves a certain resort
to neopatriarchy as they are shifting priorities to the side of primordial masculinity with a greater value
of physical strength, authoritarianism and military exploit.
The article focuses on the reclaiming of militaristic ideas and the emergence of specific “militant piety” and “theology of war” in the Orthodox discourse of post-Soviet Russia. It scrutinizes the increasing prestige of soldiering in the Church and its convergence with the army. This convergence generates particular hybrid forms, in which Church rituals and symbols interact with military ones, leading to a “symbolic reception of war” in Orthodoxy. The authors show that militaristic ideas are getting influence not only in the post-Soviet but also in American Orthodoxy; they consider this parallel as evidence that the process is caused not only by the political context—the revival of neo-imperial ideas in Russia and the increasing role of power structures in public administration—but is conditioned by socio-cultural attitudes inherent in Orthodox tradition, forming a type of militant religiosity called “militant piety”. This piety is not a matter of fundamentalism only; it represents the essential layer of religious consciousness in Orthodoxy reflected in modern Church theology, rhetoric, and aesthetics. The authors analyze war rhetoric while applying approaches of Karen Armstrong, Mark Juergensmeyer, R. Scott Appleby, and other theoreticians of the relationship between religion and violence.
This third edition of Moral Constraints on War offers a principle by principle presentation of the ethics of war as is found in the age-old tradition of the Just War. Parts one and two trace the evolution of Just War Theory, analyzing the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello: the principles that determine the conditions under which it is just to start a war and then conduct military operations. Each chapter provides a historical background of the principle under discussion and an in-depth analysis of its meaning. More so than in the previous editions, there is a special focus on the transcultural nature of the principles. Besides theoretical clarifications, each of the principles is also put to the test with numerous historical and contemporary examples. In Part three, Just War Theory is applied in three specific case studies: the use of the atomic bomb against Japan in World War II, the Korean War (1950-53), and the use of armed drones in the "war on terror." Bringing together an international coterie of philosophers and political scientists, this accessible and practical guide offers both students of military ethics and of international relations rich, up-to-date insights into the pluralistic character of Just War Theory.
What role has objectivity played in the history of science and what role does it play today? How are innovations in science possible? What is the interrelation between research practices, epistemic virtues, and the scientific self? How are epistemic virtues affected by relations of science and the public, the state, the funders, the industry, media, etc.? And what impact has the image of science as full of boldness, uncertainty, doubt, on the social legitimacy of science? Alex Pleshkov and Jan Surman discuss these and many other questions with Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, the authors of Objectivity, one of the most important books of the 21st century in the field of the history of knowledge.
In this paper, I argue for the revivification of our other name in Greek: phos.
First, I show that, although the Greeks named us anthrôpos, they also called us phos. Second, I argue that the Greeks used the word phos because we are like light. Third, I show that our way of being light-like is illuminating, which illuminates being and the truth of being, so that it can be thought and said, imagined, and sensed — especially insofar as we are this illumination. Thus, I argue that it is time to reclaim phos as our name and so rethink what it means to illuminate, whether we light up everything that is (and is not), as well as ourselves, or not.