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The article "Die flimmernde Natur der Doxa: zwischen dem Durchbruch der Befangenheit und der Gefangenschaft" deals with problems of dogmatical thinking and doxa as they are presented in philosophy of Eugen Fink (1905-1975).
The book "Erde – Wohnen – Natur. Eugen Fink über die physis des Menschen als ens cosmologicum" is an output of a research project „Life and Environment. Phenomenological Relations between Subjectivity and Natural World“ (GAČR) as well as of the conference held in on 5.-th and 6.-th of november 2015
In this chapter we are going to examine the logical connections between various descriptions of the Scientific Revolution proposed by Alexandre Koyré. We are going to propose an attentive and detailed reading of texts written by Koyré in different periods of his life in order to identify various aspects of his interpretation of the revolution in thought that occurred in early modern Europe. His most famous description of the Scientific Revolution (the dual characterization) indicates two aspects of the process that led to the emergence of classical physics: “destruction of the Cosmos” and “geometrization of space”. However, Koyré frequently used other expressions for characterization of the period, such as “mathematization of Nature”, or transition “from the world of more-or-less to the universe of precision” and “from the closed world to the open universe”. We could expect that Koyré would try to reduce his initial dual characterization to one single formula. I argue here that, on the contrary, the duality of description had a special meaning which permits us to keep in focus the complexity of the intellectual change that occurred during 17th century, when new science was rising from a new conception of reality, and a new world-view was emerging from the new science
Leo Tolstoy’s Moralism is a call for the purification of moral universals as the foundations of culture, in which there is no contradiction between the values of an individual life and the values of the social “world.” A “moralist preacher” must fulfill two main requirements. First, he must personally fulfill the principles of his teaching. Second, he must be absolutely sure that he speaks on behalf of the truth he knows. Otherwise, his preaching will be deceptive and will serve the destruction rather than creation of a moral culture. Lev Shestov rejects this pathos of preaching as incompatible with existential perception of the world. Shestov replaces “absolute morality” with the absolute of human individuality, but this absolute is incompatible with the universalism of cultural values.
Modern complexity studies and their interdisciplinary character are under consideration in this article. The conceptual framework of complexity studies includes such methodologically significant notions as nonlinearity, self-organization, creative chaos, co-evolution and blow-up regimes. It is argued that interdisciplinarity corresponding to a holistic worldview becomes a powerful trend in modern science. At the same time, evolutionary holism constitutes a philosophical basis for complexity studies. The possible future developments of complexity studies as a fundamental interdisciplinary paradigm are discussed as well. It is shown that interdisciplinary research will define the character of science in the medium-term future.
Frankfurt-type cases with covered manipulation received a great attention in the
debates about freedom of will and moral responsibility. They pretend to give the
refutation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and to show that we can
intuitively blame or praise an agent who was not able to do otherwise. In this paper, I
will try to make explicit some basic intuitions underlying the agent's responsibility in
Frankfurt-type cases, which were surprisingly ignored in the contemporary debates.
The key intuition is that the responsibility of the agent in Frankfurt-type cases is always
grounded at the point of overcoming the uncertainty preceding action. This overcoming
is crucially important for agent's responsibility and immune to any manipulation of
Book Note: Disclosing the World: On the Phenomenology of Language, by Andrew Inkpin Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2016, pp. xvi + 381, US$43 (hardback).
This paper identifies a tension in Frege’s philosophy and offers a diagnosis of its origins.Frege’s Context Principle can be used to dissolve the problem of propositional unity. However, Frege’s official response to the problem does not invoke the Context Principle, but the distinction between “saturated” and “unsaturated” propositional constituents. I argue that such a response involves assumptions that clash with the Context Principle. I suggest, however, that this tension is not generated by deep-seated philosophical commitments, but by Frege’s occasional attempt to take a dubious shortcut in the justification of his conception of propositional structure.
Koyré, his historical and philosophical studies, influence and heritage.
Koyré in Context, correlated studies and paradigms in the sciences, and in the history and philosophy of sciences
The article investigates different approaches to theoretical grounding of humanitarian intervention. Firstly conception of intervention offered by Walzer, who is known to be an advocate of unilateralism, is examined. For him states should be proactive and decisive in cases when human rights are violated somewhere. Schmitt’s arguments counter military actions in the name of moral issues are considered as well; while Schmitt’s ideal of politics as a sphere free of moral impurities seems to be imperfect. Multilateralism is proposed as alternative for Walzer’s and Schmitt’s approaches - humanitarian intervention may be justified as measure initiated by supra-state body.
On the epistemological implications of 19-century psychology of music from J.F. Herbart to H. von Helmholtz
Cet exposé prend pour hypothèse que le regard de l’autre dans L’Être et le Néant de Sartre n’est pas invisible. Pour rendre compte de cette forme spécifique de visibilité qu’est la visibilité de l’autre-sujet chez Sartre, nous passons en revue les traits distinctifs que Sartre donne au début de L’imaginaire à la perception et à l’imagination. La conclusion selon laquelle le regard de l’autre rend floue la frontière entre la perception et l’imagination nous amène à faire remarquer que ce démantèlement de l’opposition-clé du premier Sartre n’est pas fortuit dans cet endroit du texte. Si le concept de regard de l’autre bouleverse l’opposition entre la perception et l’imagination, c’est parce qu’il est appelé, dans L’Être et le Néant, à résoudre le problème dont la position défait une autre dichotomie importante du première Sartre. Dès lors que Sartre se donne pour tâche de dépasser le solipsisme en démontrant l’existence d’autrui, il est contraint de reconsidérer son opposi- tion tranchée entre la conscience et l’objet. La distinction entre autre-sujet et autre-objet, ainsi que celle entre moi-sujet et moi-objet, illégitimes du point de vue des conclusions les plus hardies de La Transcendance de l’Ego, deviennent tout à fait opérationnelles dans L’Être et le Néant. Pourtant les deux transformations (démantèlement de l’opposition entre la perception et l’imagination et introduction de la notion de sujet) restent inavouées chez Sartre. Nous concluons par les remarques générales sur la possibilité d’une double lecture de l’œuvre de Sartre.
Abstract. There is widespread opinion that, notwithstanding deviations, the political life of humanity on a large scale is on the path of progress, and humans are becoming freer and more enlightened with time. I am going to contend with this opinion, namely, with a part of it telling that the prevailing mass of the people strives to achieve more freedom and enlightenment. On the opposite, freedom, individual independence, and political rights (not to be confused with social rights, such as state care and protection) are of minor importance to the mass. The ideology of liberalism in its classical form, as created by John Locke, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill and others, yields to the pressure of the ideology of state paternalism. The pressure comes not only from above (that is, from authorities); the people also welcome more paternalism. They appear not to value their individual freedom and independence, and they are inclined to give them up voluntarily to some mighty organization such as the state in exchange for care, protection and leadership. Liberalism has played an important role in the development of human civilization and the formation of the Western world, but new ideologies and political practices are pushing it out of people’s minds. For the author, as adherent of classical liberalism, this is unfortunate. However, I wish to treat this issue realistically, even if the facts conflict with my own convictions and desires.
Methodological remarks on the connection of music and language in Johann Friedrich Herbart's philosophical psychology.
This article analyzes Nikolai Berdyaev’s (1874–1948) ideas concerning the spiritual origins of the 1917 Russian revolution. The philosopher believed that its sources were “demons” living in the Russian national spirit, discovered and awakened in the works of the Russian classics, such as Nikolai Gogol, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Leo Tolstoy. The main reason these demons were able to take hold of the Russian national consciousness was the collapse of everyday life, and the false orientation of this consciousness toward a violent establishment of a new social order. This order attempted to create a moral of equality and fair distribution of property, while lacking a religious-metaphysical foundation. Berdyaev’s views are compared with the contemporary realities in Russia at the time and the search for a resolution to the deep sociopolitical and moral contradictions inherent in these realities.
This article focuses on Ockham`s analysis of the truth conditions of past-tense, future-tense propositions and modal propositions. The main goal of this paper is to show the main similarities between them. In both cases Ockham distinguishes two ‘senses’ and suggests to create new type of propositions.
What is being? This is, from the Greeks to Hegel (according to Heidegger), the guiding question of ontology and the history of philosophy as metaphysics. And the answer is presence: ‘being’ means ‘being present’, ‘presencing’; ‘to be’ means ‘to be present’. By clarifying the limit of this philosophy of presence, however, it is possible to go beyond it, to a thinking of being as presence and absence—for both coming-to-presence and going-out-into-absence are ways in which beings are, and being happens. And yet, are presence and absence the only ways to think being? On the contrary—there is a third. From the Greeks (through Hegel) to Heidegger, the being that fails to come to presence, but also does not simply remain in absence—this is what is merely implied, an implication. But then what does it mean to think being as implied? Being as implying? As an implication?