Publications

The article is devoted to the analysis of approaches to the conceptualization of philosophical inquiry in the projects of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and Lask’s logic of philosophy. The basis for such a comparison is the adaptation of some of the conceptual tools of Lask’s philosophy in Heidegger’s writings. The approach developed in the article continues the analysis of the genesis of concepts of fundamental ontology, outlined in the research literature. Such analysis involves referring to Heidegger’s early writings and identifying significant intertextual connections, among which, undoubtedly, is the conceptual connection of Heidegger’s philosophy with Lask’s works. The purpose of this paper is primarily to show that behind this adaptation of the conceptual tools lies the area of research common to both philosophers, which is most clearly presented in their metaphilosophical reflections related to the problem of the formation of categories of philosophy. For this purpose, the article examines the most significant ideas of Lask for this problem, such as the differentiation of the roles of constitutive and reflexive categories, the principle of material determination of the logical forms, the categorial affectedness of non-sensible material, etc., as well as concepts such as validity (Geltung), material involvement (Bewandtnis), pretheoretical meanings, the moment of clarity, etc. At the same time, the paper states that Heidegger adopts these ideas critically, and also builds his strategy of conceptualizing the question of being on the basis, which is methodologically different from Lask’s logic of validity.

The article aims to show that the task of grounding categorial constituents in the specific founded acts of perception yields the problem field of phenomenological inquiry, within the framework of which remains Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology. To achieve this goal the article reconstructs, first, the problem of the possibility of a priori correspondence between meaning and intuition of the intentional act; secondly, the phenomenological justification of extension of the traditional concept of truth, as a result of which truth characteristic expands to the in a certain way structured intentional acts, namely acts of total agreement between meaning and intuition (identification acts); third, the problem of the «categorial» in the phenomenological analysis of perception, which includes the extension of the concept of perception, limited in transcendental philosophy to the area of sensible intuitions, and justification of the specific categorial acts. On this basis, the article demonstrates that (1) phenomenology in a certain sense continues the project of transcendental philosophy, but the idea of a priori correspondence between notion and intuition within the framework of structural analysis of intentionality forms a new research problem. (2) The phenomenological understanding of truth in terms of the dynamic of empty and filled meaning intention is significant for the concept of truth presented by Heidegger in Being and Time. Heidegger explicates the concept of the truth in fundamental ontology on the basis of the idea of identification. (3) The extension of the concept of object to its categorial constitution justified by Husserl provides fundamental ontology with the research subject. Heidegger interprets the categories, phenomenally represented in acts of categorial intuition, as a priori structures of the being of beings. The study also ascertains that new concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology saturate the conceptual framework of fundamental ontology. However, Heidegger also rethinks the key concepts of phenomenology following the tasks, which are different from the original tasks of the project of phenomenology designed by Husserl.

The paper sketches a way to connect the cognitively realistic notion of relevance needed for social coordination and game-theoretic models of such coordination, in particular, that of correlated equilibrium. Such a connection would help to answer the question of how social coordination described in game theory is evolutionary and cognitively possible. The main argument put forward is to equate a signal’s relevance to its information quantity—the more relevant a signal is, the more it changes probabilities of action.

This paper considers the situation of ethnographic observation of zoologist’s scientific practice at an outdoor school dedicated to science and technology studies. However, in the process of observation the object of study is changing, since the zoologist sees her aim at the school as pedagogical. The ambiguity of the situation is illustrated with help of transcript analysis of conversation. The ambiguity consists of situation having characteristic features of both formal and mundane types of interaction. Due to structural organization analysis of that situation it is possible to say that considered interaction is quasi-formal because its interaction order does not prescribe desirable behavior but only restricts possible one. Philosophical implications of the theoretical frame undertaken by the author to better grasp empirical material are considered in the end of the paper.

In 2019, a new book by Lenhard was published. Lenhard attempts to separate computer simulations from classical mathematical modeling. Having structured the material accumulated over the years of research into three parts, Lenhard correctly, without starting the construction of revolutionary metaphysical concepts, takes the reader through the new world of the philosophy of computer simulations. In the first part, the author proves the thesis that computer simulations are a completely new, previously unknown, type of mathematical modeling. The second part focuses on the conceptual epistemic transformations of mathematical modeling as applied to computer simulations. Particular importance is attached to the verification methods used in scientific experiments: verification and validation. In the third part, Lenhard, questioning the purely scientific rational way of knowing, tries to grope for the contours of new methods that will be due to the use of computer simulations in scientific research practice. In this article, we will analyze the problem areas that Lenhard identifies in his book as the most important for understanding the philosophical essence of computer simulations.

The article considers the influence of Dostoevsky’s thought to the philosophy of N.A. Berdyaev and

S.L. Frank. The crucial concept and experience of “living knowledge” and its anticipation in

Dostoevsky’s heritage are discussed. Given that the problem of “living knowledge” overpasses the boundaries

of pure gnoseology, we examines themes of ethical ideal, the meaning of religious belief and its

existential significance. Besides that, in the article are presented three interrelated projects of theodicy in

the Russian philosophy of 20th century (by N.A. Berdyaev, B.P. Vysheslavtsev and S.L. Frank). All of

these projects are grounded in Dostoevsky’s thought. The supplement to the article consists of the first

Russian translation of N.A. Arsenyev’s lecture “The central inspiration of Dostoevsky”.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the key provisions of Rozanov’s early theoretical treatise “On Understanding”, which is a model of Russian philosophical idealism. It shows that Rozanov’s work, which anticipated some ideas of hermeneutics and phenomenology in the 20th century, remained unnoticed within the Russian philosophical tradition. The purpose of this article is to reveal the basis of Rozanov’s thesis that the first idea of reason potentially contains all knowledge in unity. The author analyzes the following aspects of Rozanov’s work related to the problem of understanding: the motive and purpose of writing a treatise, the theme of innate ideas, the concept of vivacity of ideas, the theory of potential knowledge and its subject, the cyclical process of understanding,   the   difference   between   mind   and   reason,   understanding   from   knowledge. Rozanov’s interpretation of the idea of reason, the scheme of reason, and the doctrine of number are   also   reconstructed.  The   paper   concludes:   the   fundamental   thesis   of   Rozanov   about   the embeddedness of all knowledge in the unity of the first idea of reason is justified by the primacy of the position of the idea in the taxonomy of cognitive acts. And also, by the fact that the purpose of the cognitive process pushes reason to itself.

In the modern Russian philosophy, discussions about the phenomenon of computer simulations in the scientific research practice of conducting experiments are just beginning to pass the stage of initiation in small interdisciplinary groups studying this new direction for the philosophy of science. At the same time, in Western philosophy by the current moment there have been formed entire directions for the study of computer simulations. Different groups of researchers in different ways form ideas about the basic characteristics of simulations: from skeptical views on their nature, which are of no philosophical interest, to extremely revolutionary attitudes that assign simulations to the main role in the next expected turn of philosophy, comparable in its power to the linguistic turn in early XX century. One of the main controversial issues in Western philosophical thought was the search for relevant criteria and signs of simulations that could create a solid basis for formulating a rigorous definition of this phenomenon. Thus, through the definition, researchers first of all try, on the one hand, to solve the taxonomic problem of the correlation and interconnection of simulations with other types of experiment: natural, laboratory, mental, mathematical. On the other hand, to reveal for philosophy ontological and epistemological foundations of simulations, which carry the potential of new philosophical knowledge. This article is devoted to a brief review of the existing concepts of representatives of Western schools of thought on the phenomenon of computer simulations in the context of the philosophy of science. The structure of the review is built on three basic conceptual directions: 1) definition of the term "computer simulation"; 2) computer simulations as an experiment; 3) the epistemic value of simulations. Such a review can become the subject of discussion for Russian researchers interested in the impact of computer simulations on science and philosophy

This article attempts to explore Carl Schmitt’s political theology with reference to the philosophical and literature heritage of Søren Kierkegaard. For most modern scholars, the presence of this ideological connection is no longer something unknown or to be doubted. In the key statements of political theology, the dialectic of exception and of the universal is found, appearing in the same way as it was formulated by Kierkegaard. More often, the exception is the one that attracts the attention of specialists. However, in addition to the exception, Kierkegaard also speculated on repetition; it was the Danish philosopher’s work of the same name that was the source of the quotation with which Schmitt illustrated the significance of the sovereign decision for the systematic doctrine of the state. This paper redefines Schmitt’s main ideas through the notion of repetition, and demonstrates the theoretical novelty and productivity of this approach to the study of the heritage of one of the key political thinkers of the twentieth century.

The article discusses Vyacheslav Ivanov’s interpretation of “the Russian Idea” concept. In particular, it demonstrates the philosophical nature of this concept in the context of Vyacheslav Ivanov’s theory of symbolism. This calls into question the “mystical” interpretation of the sociopolitical views of the thinker, which already during his lifetime became one of the arguments of his critics.

The author refers to the most “mysterious” work of Vyacheslav Ivanov which was essentially his testament. It is shown that “The Tale of Tsarevich Svetomir” is the quintessence of Ivanov’s philosophical worldview. The author maintains that some key concepts of Ivanov’s cultural philosophy find their artistic embod­iment in the “Tale”: symbol, myth, Russian idea, element. The author examines the genre classification of the “Tale” and concludes that the Ivanov’s choice of the genre of the work was determined by the use of folklore material in the framework of modernist literary experiments, which is characteristic of the poet­ics of Silver Age. The distinctive features of Ivanov's symbolism in relation to the artistic trends of the Silver Age are also indicated. The mythological form of the “Tale” reflects Ivanov's philosophy of mythology which can be therefore un­derstood as a structure-forming principle of the artwork. This makes it possible to use the basic concepts of Ivanovs’s symbolism as hermeneutic keys to “The Tale of Tsarevich Svetomir”. The final part of the article justifies the hy­pothesis that the Russian idea qua myth constitutes the main content of “The Tale of Tsarevich Svetomir”.

Review

Abstract. The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of “Anglo-American philosophy of law” and highlight the debate on its subject. Both the geographical reference to the Anglo-American tradition and the content of the philosophy of law itself need to be clarified. In order to understand what the Anglo-American philosophy of law is and what is the essence of the debate around its subject matter the author of the article firstly investigates the main stages in the development of the Anglo-American philosophy of law, beginning with Jeremy Bentham and ending with modern authors. As a result, we arrive at a conclusion that the ways of development of the philosophical and legal tradition in Great Britain and the United States are not identical. Secondly, we should analyze the term “philosophy of law”. Overwhelming majority of Anglo-American scholars identify the terms “legal philosophy”, “jurisprudence” and “analytical legal positivism”. Therefore, “philosophy of law” and “jurisprudence” mostly are used as synonyms. It is also important that the concept “jurisprudence” in the Anglo-American Academy is not used in its wide sense as in Russian science. It includes only abstract theoretical, not practical, study of law and general legal concepts (general jurisprudence) and theoretical foundations of branches of law and legal systems (special jurisprudence). The author concludes that the debate about the method that has been going on since the 50s of twenty century between positivists and anti-positivists, smoothly turned into a new dispute about the subject matter of Anglo-American philosophy of law. The main object of the dispute is the legal philosophy “analytical core”. Supporters of the core use a conceptual analysis of legal concepts beyond time, politics, morality, and social context. The author of the articleanalyzed the main critical papers devoted to the current state of the legal philosophy and came to the conclusion that we can distinguish two major types: (1) papers that criticize the “analytical core” of the philosophy of law and try to separate pluralistic jurisprudence and limited abstract legal philosophy, (2) papers which tend to change the very philosophy of law, reorienting it to the social context, political philosophy, ethics, etc. Also, as a result of the research two different understandings of the content of analytical philosophy of law were discovered. First on the one hand is analytical positivism, which includes legal positivists (J. Austin, I. Bentham, G.L.A. Hart, etc.). On the other hand, in a broader sense, it is perceived as an intellectual style. In this sense we can call anti-positivists like natural lawyer J. Finnis and the founder of legal interpretivism, R. Dworkin as analytical scholars.

The article is focused around ontological status of state in modern political real­ism. It seems that possibility of moral evaluation depends on the existence of the evaluated object. Only the real objects can be fully valuable. The article demon­strates that theoretical abstraction of social world can function as values only by being the ends that have to be fulfilled. The notion of state plays crucial role in re­alist theory, while states themselves are basic units of international system. This puts the state in an ambivalent position. On the one hand realists view state as a mere theoretical abstraction without proper existence. On the other hand state acts as a value in analysis of statesmen motives. The author claims that realism, be­ing an “understanding” social theory, is stuck between scientific and political value systems. This problem is possible to solve by splitting the concept of state (and re­lated notions), based on the context of its usage.

The research is dedicated to the critical comparison of two phenomenological strategies that elaborate the issue of space (G. Bachelard’s and D. Trigg’s), and link the placement in space with the emotional and bodily experience and the capacity of human to extend beyond. Phenomenological descriptions of the spacial experience indicate the deeply emotional colouring of human attitude towards place, that implies searching for one’s “own place in the world”, or a home. The article develops the idea that the relationship between the human and the space (or the way the body perceives the space) can be conceptualized through the concepts of topophilia and topophobia. This explanation has existential ground, and it has to deal with poetic imagination, hope and anxiety. The concepts of the friendly/unfriendly landscape or environment cannot be reduced to the personal or subjective judgement on its ergonomics, but it also cannot be limited to the constructive characteristics and pecularities of some place perceived as a “workspace”, “leisure area” etc. The friendliness of the space as such can be comprehended through the phenomenological description of bodily experience and the corresponding research of topophilia and topophobia, which should be treated not as psychological diagnosis or concrete attitudes of consciousness, but as phenomena, which are revealing itself in the world. Phenomenology of bodily presence in space can be seen as a prolific method, that could provide the descriptions of experience, which are necessary for implementation of “the right of the city” (H. Lefebvre).