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Frege: The Power and the Limits of Logical Abstraction

Abstract: In this talk, I analyze several aspects of Axiom V and Humes Principle. The issues dealt with include self-evidence and epistemic value with special emphasis on Axiom V, Freges attitude towards Axiom V before and after Russells discovery of the contradiction, as well as the possible role and the status of Humes Principle in the face of Russells paradox. In the central part, I pursue a threefold aim: (a) to shed new light on the connection between Freges way of introducing the primitive function-names of his logical system and the requisite self- evidence of his axioms in whose expression such a function-name occurs; (b) to analyze the semantic nature of the formal linguistic expression of Axiom V, and (c) to examine the conflict between the requirements of self-evidence and real epistemic value or genuine knowledge arising inevitably and invariably from Fregean abstraction principles, if they are singled out as axioms of a theory T.

- When: Thursday 11 May, 2017, 3 P.M.
- Where: Institute of Philosophy RAS (12/1 Goncharnaya Str., Moscow, 109240), Room 416 (4th floor)
- Organization: jointly by Vitaly Dolgorukov (HSE, Formal Philosophy group) and Andrei Rodin (IPRAS)