Transcendentalism as the New Paradigm of Philosophy (philosophizing)

**Abstract.** In the paper we have attempted to consider Kant’s transcendental philosophy as a special type of philosophizing and the new transcendental paradigm, which differs from both the ‘object’ metaphysics of Antiquity and ‘subject’ metaphysics of the Modern Age (transcendent — *transcendental* — immanent metaphysics). For this purpose we shall introduce the methodological terms ‘transcendental shift’ and ‘transcendental perspective’. The basis for such representation of transcendentalism is the cognitive and semantic reading of the *Critique* and theory of ‘two aspects’. While in classical metaphysics cognition is interpreted as a relation between empirical subject and object, in transcendental metaphysics (perspective) ‘possible experience’ (*Erfahrung*) shall be understood as a relation between ‘consciousness generally’ (transcendental subject) and ‘thing-in-general’ (transcendental object). In this, Kant’s transcendentalism, in contrast to classical contemplative metaphysics, acts as an ‘experimental’ metaphysics and the transcendentality is defined as the intermediate between the immanent and transcendent ontological area (as a “instrumental” component of our cognition).